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Abstract
While an abundance of school choice literature focuses on student achievement
outcomes, little has been done to determine the mechanisms involved in producing such
outcomes. We present a comparative analysis of private and public school principals using data
from the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) 2011-2012. We add to the literature by examining
the differences in private and public school principals’ abilities to influence important decisions
at their schools. We conclude that private schooling may have a systematic advantage over
public schooling since private school leadership exhibits more autonomy in influencing relevant
decisions.
Keywords: school choice; school leadership; school management; School and Staffing
Survey
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Introduction
“While the public school principal is bound most by red tape, the private school
principal is bound most by his or her conscience.”
—John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, 1988, p. 1076
School choice has emerged as a key intervention in school reform globally. In fact, the
United States President-Elect, Donald Trump, promised massive expansion of private school
choice through a reallocation of $20 billion in federal funding in 2017. Evidence suggests that
private schools slightly outperform public schools on improving student achievement within the
US as well as internationally (Betts & Tang, 2011; Forster, 2016; Greene, 2005; Shakeel,
Anderson, & Wolf, 2016; Tooley, 2005; Tooley, Bao, Dixon, & Merrifield, 2011). Most of the
school choice studies focus on student achievement (West & Woessmann, 2010; Witte, 2001;
Witte et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2013). Out of the nineteen experimental studies of private school
choice in the United States, the only negative findings for test scores were from the two studies
of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015; Mills & Wolf,
2016).
Other studies have examined impacts on the long-term outcomes of students such as
attainment (Booker et al., 2008; Zimmer, 2009; Cowen et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2013) and
criminal activity (Deming, 2011; Dobbie & Fryer, 2015; DeAngelis & Wolf, 2016). While this
evidence is limited, the existing studies have found that access to school choice reduces criminal
activity and teen pregnancy while increasing the likelihood of graduating from high school.
Additionally, access to private school choice may increase performance in public schools
through competitive effects (Egalite, 2013; Egalite, 2016; Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene &
Winters, 2003; Sandström & Bergström, 2005) and increase civic skills such as voter activity,
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volunteering, charitable activity, and tolerance of others (Campbell, 2002; Bettinger & Slonim,
2006; Fleming, 2014; Fleming, Mitchell, & McNally, 2014).
Though many studies have examined whether private schools outperform public schools,
few have looked at why there are differences in short and long-term student outcomes. Wolf and
Hoople (2006) attempted to peer into the black box of the school choice reform through
examination of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program and found that the successful private
schools allocated fewer resources to facilities and programs. Our study fits into the literature by
examining a potential explanation for why school choice could have an advantage in producing
slightly positive outcomes for students.
We examine the differences in the autonomy of school leaders, which may increase the
likelihood that leaders can adapt to the changing needs of students and staff within their schools.
Effective leadership, and an environment to support the ability to make effective decisions within
a school, may be important for creating a high-quality educational experience for children
(Rousmaniere, 2013). For example, Grissom, Loeb and Master (2013) find that principals that
can spend time on things such as the school’s education curriculum can positively influence
student achievement. Conversely, they find that principals that spend more time on activities
such as simple classroom walkthroughs may have a negative impact on student growth.
Additionally, Ouchi (2009) and Hess (2013) point out that student learning cannot be improved
unless school leaders have control over important school-level activities such as curriculum and
the budget.
In schooling, leaders that are free to influence important decisions may be better able to
change their approach to curriculum, instruction, or professional development practices if their
leaders notice inefficiencies (Tekleselassie & Villarreal III, 2011). However, schools with
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constrained leadership will be less likely to capitalize on the benefits associated with needed
reform strategies. Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin (2013) point out that highly effective principals
increase student learning by two to seven months within a single school year. Chubb and Moe
(1988, p. 1065) found that the public and private schools were “distinctively different in
environment and organization” and that private school principals had more teaching experience
than public school principals. They also theorized that greater autonomy would exist in private
schools with respect to their structure, goals and school operations. However, Chubb and Moe
did not empirically test this specific theory.
We provide the first study to empirically test the hypothesis that the private schooling
sector allows for more leadership autonomy by using nationally representative survey data of
principals in the United States for the 2011-12 school year from the School and Staffing Survey.
We compare the reported differences between public and private school principals’ influence on
decision-making activities within their schools. Since we simply want to make overall
comparisons between the two types of institutions, we do not examine subcategories of private
schools and public schools.
Theory
In private schools, families have lower transaction costs associated with opting to leave
the school, making the school operators more prone to the threat of a shutdown condition
(Friedman, 1955; West, 1981). However, loss for a private school is not only monetary in the
short-run; it can also cause several chain reactions such as damaged brand name, threat to
teachers’ jobs, and threat of change in the perception of future clients. Since families are more
able to leave the private school if they are dissatisfied, it is more necessary for the school leader
to be able to make changes to influence customer satisfaction levels (Smith, 1776; West, 1997).
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If a private school principal is able to make the decisions necessary to adapt to the signals
transmitted by his or her clients, the quality of their schooling should increase. Since the public
school often has a monopoly on public funding, and their customers are assigned residentially,
their leaders do not need to adapt to dissatisfaction as quickly (Hoxby, 2007; Peterson, 1998;
Peterson & Hassel, 1998). In other words, the transaction costs for a customer leaving a public
school are much higher, especially since it would require Tiebout choice (Tiebout, 1956) or
paying for a private school out of pocket (Friedman & Friedman, 1990; Merrifield, 2008).
In fact, since the transaction costs are typically much higher in order to exit a public
school, large amounts of principal autonomy may not be desirable in that sector (Neal, 2002). If
a malicious, or simply ineffective, principal becomes the leader of the school, we may not want
them making school-level decisions that could negatively affect students (Hayek, 2011). If the
ineffective principal is free to make bad decisions, many students may be harmed without much
of an exit option, especially if they come from a disadvantaged family (Gaventa, 1982; Lerner,
1995). Since this scenario is potentially more likely and costly in public institutions, the public
sector may be more likely to be set up in a way to limit the possibility of this negative event
occurring. As a result, an official from the central office may be more likely to control the
important school-level decisions.
The private school principal is likely to have more influence in decision-making since the
private schools have fewer political constraints and enjoy more autonomy in selection of students
and daily administration than public schools (Firestone & Shipps, 2005; Shipps & White, 2009;
White, 2006). Since private school principal are at least less likely to feel the pressures of
political constraints, they may feel more confident and able to influence school-level activities.
Private school leaders may be more likely to establish an environment of similar students
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working towards a uniform mission through selective-admissions and an improved match
between school goals and student interests.
Additionally, private school principals may face a stronger dismissal threat than their
public school counterparts. If school leaders have fewer costs associated with dismissing their
principals, they will be more likely to be able to hold them accountable for their actions. If a
private school principal can be dismissed easily, they will have a stronger incentive to make
effective decisions. On the other hand, if a school principal is protected through unionization or
otherwise, they will be more likely to make ineffective decisions without the same level of
accountability (Chubb & Moe, 1986; Painter, 2000; Tucker, 1997; Weisburg et al., 2009). Since
it is more difficult to fire a principal in the public sector, we expect that a centralized official will
reduce their autonomy in order to limit negative outcomes for students. Furthermore, since
school principals in the public sector are more likely to have an incentive to maximize budgets,
we expect that central offices will not grant them much autonomy over finance decisions
(Niskanen, 1971).
Data
The data for the public and private school principals comes from the School and Staffing
Survey (SASS) 2011-2012 questionnaire. SASS was developed by the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) and it has been administered seven times since 1987-88 to 20112012. Table 1 lists the question categories and what they measure1. The public school principal
data file contained 7,510 records while the private school principal data file contained 1,720

1

For more information, see
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/pdf/1112/SASS2A.pdf (for public school principals) and
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/pdf/1112/SASS2B.pdf (for private school principals).
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records. There were some additional questions for public school principals, but in this paper, we
compare only the common questions related to decision making.
Our dependent variables come from questions 16-A through 16-G on decision-making in
SASS 2011-2012. These variables measure the influence principals perceive to have on setting
performance standards, establishing curriculum, determining content for professional
development, evaluating teachers, hiring teachers, setting discipline policy, and deciding how the
budget will be spent. This section asks the principals to rate their ability to influence seven
school related activities on a four-item Likert scale (no influence, minor influence, moderate
influence and major influence) and it includes a not applicable option for each activity (Table 1).
[Table 1 about here]
We utilize questions from the survey that relate to principal’s demographics, academic
and professional background for summary statistics. Tables 2A and 2B show the population
weighted summary statistics expressed as percentages for the principals in public and private
schools. Overall, private school principals report more years of principal experience but lower
education levels in comparison to the public school principals. This is consistent with the
findings of Hill et al. (2016). The proportion of private school principals reporting greater than
10 years of experience as a principal or school head is almost double that of public school
principals. The proportion of private school principals involved in teaching in addition to their
task as a principal or school head is also about twice that for public school principals.
A higher proportion of public school principals report having previous experience as a
department head, assistant principal or program director and participation in a school training or
development program in comparison to their private counterparts. The proportion of public
school principals holding a school administration license is about twice as large as private school
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principals. Almost all public school principals earned a MA or higher degree while only 76% of
the private school principals report so. The racial composition of principals is largely white in
both the sectors (86% in public schools and 90% in private schools; this excludes mixed race, so
it is a lower bound). Lastly, private schools have a larger share of females in their leadership in
comparison to the public schools.
[Table 2A about here]
[Table 2B about here]
We also report summary statistics on the percent of private and public school principals
to report having a major influence on of the seven outcome categories in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
Methods
Since the survey responses related to decision-making are ordinal and have four
categories (from “No Influence” to “Major Influence”), the analytic technique we employ is an
ordered logistic regression (Borooah, 2002; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) of the form:
𝜋

Logit (Y) = ln (1−𝜋) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒

Equation (1)

Therefore:
𝜋 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑌 = 𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒)
𝜋=

Equation (2)

𝑒 𝛼+𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒
1 + 𝑒 𝛼+𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒

The dependent variable of interest is the reported decision-making ability of a given
principal, i, for the following school-level activities: setting student performance standards,
establishing curriculum, determining teacher professional development content, evaluating
teachers, hiring new full-time teachers, setting discipline policy and deciding how the budget
will be spent. This variable takes the value 1 for the least influence and value 4 for the highest
9
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influence.2 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 is a dummy variable of value 1 if the principal is in a private school, and 0
if the principal is in a public school. The coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, measures the mean
difference of the decision-making influence reported by private school principals relative to
public school principals. The odds ratio,𝜋, is the likelihood for private school principals, relative
to public school principals, to report having a major influence on a given school-level activity.
Since we want to examine the differences between principals based solely on the type of
institution they are in, this initial model does not control for any principal or school-level
differences. In order to construct a conservative estimate of the association between institutiontype and decision-making freedom, we construct the following model that also includes school
and principal characteristics as controls:
𝜋

Logit (Y) = ln (1−𝜋) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝑋

Equation (1)

Therefore:
𝜋 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑌 = 𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑋 = 𝑥)
𝜋=

Equation (2)

𝑒 𝛼+𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒+𝛽2X
1 + 𝑒 𝛼+𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒+𝛽2X

𝑋 is a vector of controls which includes the following principal characteristics: race,
gender, education level, years of experience as a principal or school head, years of experience as
a teacher in elementary or secondary school, any experience as a department head, any
experience as an assistant principal, participation in professional development or training
programs, management experience outside of education, and whether the principle holds a
license in school administration. Vector X also includes these school-level characteristics:
school size, school level, number of full-time teachers, student/teacher ratio, percent of minority

2

Since the dependent variable is ordinal, we use ordered logit regression and report average marginal effects for
the likelihood of reporting “major influence.”
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teachers, and percent of minority students. This second model includes school and principal
level controls in order to examine if the effects are significant after accounting for differences in
the types of schools and principals hired across the two institutions.
The restricted use data provided by the NCES are imputed and adjusted for non-response.
Based on the stratified probability proportionate to size (PPS) sampling strategy used by NCES
in the SASS, we use the balance repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap methodology3 so that the
results reflect the true population values and not just the sampled units. This methodology does
not change our final estimates, but rather corrects the formula for the calculation of the standard
errors.
Results
We now present the results for our models with and without controls in Table 4. The first
row presents results without any controls, the second includes principal-level controls, and the
third includes all school and principal-level controls. The results are robust across models;
however, the model without controls only finds statistical significance for the first four
categories.
The model with all controls indicates that private school principals are more likely to
report having a major influence on 6 out of 7 types of school decisions. When controlling for
school and principal-level differences across sectors, we find evidence that private school
principals exercise significantly more influence over decision-making activities. In particular,
private school principals have a higher likelihood of reporting to have a major influence over
performance standards, curriculum, professional development, hiring teachers, discipline policy,
and budget decisions. However, private schools principals have a 3.9 percentage point, or 4.1

3

Details can be found in the User’s Manual for the 2011–12 Schools and Staffing Survey:
https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/methods0708.asp
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percent, lower likelihood of reporting to have a major influence on the evaluation of teachers.
Since private school principals have a 4.9-percentage point higher likelihood of having a major
influence over the hiring of teachers, they may not need to provide as much direct feedback. In
addition, since private school principals have a 14.4-percentage point, or 20.7 percent, higher
likelihood of having a major influence on the content of their teacher professional development
programs, they may provide feedback through that channel instead. Notably, private school
principals have a 20-percentage point, or 47 percent, higher likelihood of reporting that they have
a major influence on establishing their school’s curriculum. Furthermore, private school
principals have a 14-percentage point, or 19 percent, higher likelihood of reporting that they have
a major influence on their students’ performance standards. This may be especially important
for the ability of the principal to positively impact student achievement.
[Table 4 about here]
Based on our results, we expect that the reduced regulatory burden found in private
schools grants the principals the ability to exercise more influence related to school activities in
comparison to public school principals. To explore our analysis further, we examine the
coefficients on the control variables for our preferred model, found in Table 5.
[Table 5 about here]
Most of our school-level controls are unrelated to the seven outcome measures of
interest; however, some statistical significance emerges. Principals within larger schools are
more likely to report having a major influence on performance standards, but less likely to report
so for establishing curriculum. Principals in secondary schools are more likely to report having a
major influence in performance standards and curriculum, but less likely to report having
influence over discipline and budget decisions. Being in a school with a more diverse set of
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teachers is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a major influence on performance
standards and curriculum.
The coefficient on the principal’s previous experience as a department head is significant
and positive in all cases except for the case of teacher evaluation, where it is not statistically
different from zero. Hence, previous leadership experience has a systematic positive relationship
with the principal’s ability to influence school level activities. Lower levels of previous
principal experience and previous teaching experience are associated with a lower likelihood of
reporting to have an influence on most categories.
Having a master’s or higher degree appears to be a positive principal characteristic. It
could be that education itself improves decision-making ability or that people that choose to
pursue more education are also more motivated and confident. The coefficient on female is
positive throughout and statistically significant for three of the seven activities. Females seem to
have systematic advantages over males in their influence over school-related activities, even
after controlling for background and types of school. Since about three-fourths of all elementary
and secondary-level teachers are female, female principals may be more able to have a strong
connection with their employees (Goldring et al., 2013). Minority principals have a lower
likelihood of reporting that they have an influence over hiring teachers and setting discipline
policy, but a higher likelihood of reporting that they have an influence over student performance
standards and curriculum.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The principals in both sectors differ significantly in decision-making abilities when it
comes to their influence on school-level activities. The private school principals may have an
advantage over their public school counterparts by having significantly more influence on almost
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all the school related activities. Principal characteristics, like previous experience as a
department head and having a Masters or higher degree, play a positive role in their ability to
exercise higher influence on school activities. Nevertheless, the private school sector may be
able to learn from the public school sector in evaluating teachers. Female principals appear to
have a systematic advantage over their male counterparts in reporting more decision-making
influence related to school activities.
In terms of policy implications, private school principals report to have more autonomy
than public school principals on every aspect of decision-making ability except the evaluation of
teachers. These findings may point towards the need of training in evaluation activities for the
private sector. However, it could mean that the private school sector has a lower need for direct
teacher feedback since they have more autonomy in hiring decisions and more involvement in
the schools, as Chubb and Moe (1988) find. If principal autonomy is associated with enhanced
educational experiences for children, and the private sector allows for more decision-making
freedom, we should increase access to private school choice. However, these policy decisions
would benefit substantially from additional research linking principal autonomy to student-level
outcomes.
Our results may also reflect the emphasis that recent Race to the Top related policy
changes have imposed on traditional public schools (Maranto et al., 2016). Ouchi (2009) has
emphasized the importance of principal autonomy and argued that principals know what happens
at the school-level while central office employees do not. Perhaps, the relatively short tenure but
greater credentialing of public school principals, as well as larger school size may suggest that
they are climbers; that is, they see the principal position as a stepping-stone to the
superintendence and focus on pleasing superiors rather than serving kids (Downs, 1967; Maranto
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et al., 2016). Cheng (2015) finds that schools where principals have more autonomy over
personnel have greater mission coherence, though his sample only includes public schools.
Since we have relied on self-reported measures in school surveys, the results are prone to
social desirability bias as well as reference group bias (Dobbie & Fryer, 2015; West et al., 2015).
Although SASS is a nationally representative sample and stable results over time can have good
external validity, future studies should utilize other measures like value-added measures related
to school’s graduation rates and teacher turnover to study principal’s leadership qualities.
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Table 1: School-Related Activities over Which the Principal Has Influence
Category School-related activities
A
Setting performance standards for students of this school
B
Establishing curriculum at this school
C
Determining the content of in-service professional development programs for
teachers of this school
D
Evaluating teachers of this school
E
Hiring new full-time teachers of this school
F
Setting discipline policy at this school
G
Deciding how your school budget will be spent

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795138

WHO IS MORE FREE? A COMPARISON OF THE DECISION-MAKING
Table 2A: Summary Statistics for Principal Characteristics
Measure
Public Private
Years principal or school head at this or any school prior to this year
no experience
8.32
8.78
low experience 1-3
24.55 18.82
medium experience 4-10
43.79 30.97
high experience 10+
23.34 41.43
Years principal or school head at this school prior to this year
no experience
16.46 14.52
low experience 1-3
38.83 27.62
medium experience 4-10
36.07 32.92
high experience 10+
8.64 24.94
Years of elementary or secondary teaching before becoming principal or school head
no experience
1.70 18.51
low experience 1-3
2.79
7.99
medium experience 4-10
47.34 32.79
high experience 10+
48.16 40.71
Years of elementary or secondary teaching since becoming principal or school head
no experience
90.41 49.69
low experience 1-3
5.42 21.87
medium experience 4-10
3.30 15.87
high experience 10+
0.87 12.56
Currently teaching at school
37.37 71.89
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each italicized category.

24

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795138

WHO IS MORE FREE? A COMPARISON OF THE DECISION-MAKING
Table 2B: Summary Statistics for Principal Characteristics
Measure
Public Private
Prior to becoming a principal of school head
Worked as department head
40.36 35.33
Worked as an assistant principal or program director
73.85 43.82
Participated in school training or development program
55.34 31.41
Previous management experience outside education
40.28 46.43
Currently holding license in school administration
95.99 43.36
Having a bachelor’s degree
99.94 88.47
Bachelor degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education
81.93 67.78
Having a master’s degree
97.61 76.34
Master’s degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education
97.36 85.38
Earned a MA and higher degree
97.82 68.96
Participated in any professional development activity related to principal or school head in last 12 months 99.32 89.56
Race (white)
86.36 90.19
Gender (male)
48.38 44.64
N
7,510 1,720
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Principals’ Self-Reported Major Influence on Outcome Variables
Measure
Public
Private
Performance Standards
73.32
80.37
Establishing Curriculum
42.63
69.07
Professional Development
69.49
74.21
Teacher Evaluation
95.34
82.01
Hiring Teachers
84.33
83.73
Discipline Policy
79.40
81.54
Budget Spending
63.79
62.06
N
7,510
1,720
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.

Table 4: Results Based on Model Used
Performance
Standards
0.072***
(0.018)

Establishing
Curriculum
0.247***
(0.017)

Professional
Development
0.126***
(0.019)

Teacher
Evaluation
-0.064***
(0.009)

Hiring
Teachers
0.019
(0.014)

Discipline
Policy
0.018
(0.014)

Budget
Spending
0.001
(0.017)

Principal Controls

0.146***
(0.017)

0.259***
(0.018)

0.141***
(0.017)

-0.034***
(0.009)

0.050***
(0.014)

0.060***
(0.017)

0.049**
(0.021)

Principal and School Controls

0.140***
(0.018)

0.200***
(0.019)

0.144***
(0.016)

-0.039***
(0.009)

0.049***
(0.014)

0.067***
(0.017)

0.071***
(0.021)

9,230

9,230

9,230

9,230

9,230

9,230

9,230

No Controls

Observations

Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of private on the “major influence” category, estimated after running ordered logit
models. Demographic variables, academic training, professional development and educational attainment levels are included as
controls. Estimates use balanced repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap population weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Likelihood of Reporting Major Influence (All Controls)
Private School Principal
School Size
School Level
Number of Full Time Teachers
Student/Teacher Ratio
Teacher Diversity
Minority Students
Low principal Experience
Low Teaching Experience
Department Head
Assistant Principal/Program Director
School Training/ Development
License in School Administration
Management Experience
Master’s Degree or Higher
Professional Development

Performance
Standards
0.140***
(0.018)
0.009*
(0.005)
0.018*
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.060**
(0.025)
-0.042
(0.035)
0.034***
(0.012)
-0.027*
(0.015)
0.044***
(0.013)
0.045**
(0.022)
0.005
(0.014)
0.062**
(0.030)
0.146***

Establishing
Curriculum
0.200***
(0.019)
-0.011*
(0.006)
0.073***
(0.008)
-0.001**
(0.001)
-0.002*
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.053**
(0.023)
-0.064
(0.040)
0.052***
(0.012)
-0.046***
(0.013)
0.015
(0.013)
0.032
(0.023)
0.012
(0.014)
-0.004
(0.028)
0.148***

Professional
Development
0.144***
(0.016)
0.009
(0.007)
0.017
(0.011)
-0.001*
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.037
(0.029)
0.069
(0.076)
0.039***
(0.012)
0.001
(0.013)
0.018*
(0.011)
0.022
(0.023)
-0.023*
(0.014)
-0.024
(0.047)
0.034

Teacher
Evaluation
-0.039***
(0.009)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.004)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.016)
-0.034**
(0.016)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)
0.031***
(0.009)
0.002
(0.007)
0.007
(0.011)
0.019
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Hiring
Teachers
0.049***
(0.014)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
0.015
(0.022)
-0.050*
(0.029)
0.034***
(0.011)
0.007
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.009)
0.004
(0.013)
0.001
(0.011)
0.035*
(0.019)
0.059

Discipline
Policy
0.067***
(0.017)
0.007
(0.006)
-0.017**
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.085***
(0.026)
-0.049*
(0.029)
0.024**
(0.012)
-0.029*
(0.015)
0.015
(0.010)
0.037*
(0.020)
0.017
(0.012)
0.051*
(0.027)
0.054

Budget
Spending
0.071***
(0.021)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.044***
(0.010)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.095***
(0.023)
0.028
(0.043)
0.041***
(0.015)
0.032**
(0.013)
0.016
(0.012)
0.019
(0.031)
-0.006
(0.014)
0.075**
(0.033)
0.076
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White
Female
Observations

(0.046)
-0.006
(0.018)
0.022
(0.015)
9,230

(0.057)
-0.041*
(0.023)
0.022
(0.014)
9,230

(0.126)
0.010
(0.019)
0.052***
(0.015)
9,230

(0.020)
0.002
(0.009)
0.020***
(0.006)
9,230

(0.056)
0.035**
(0.015)
0.015
(0.011)
9,230

(0.036)
0.051***
(0.016)
0.015
(0.012)
9,230

(0.062)
0.020
(0.021)
0.034**
(0.014)
9,230

Notes: Table reports average marginal effects for the “major influence” category, estimated after running ordered logit models.
Estimates use balanced repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap population weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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